In this paper, we develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of social security to address two questions. First, how is social security sustained? Second, how does inequality a¤ect the size of social security, and can the theoretical predictions be consistent with the observed puzzling relationships between inequality and the size of social security? As a stark framework, our model economy features the absence of altruism, commitment, reputation mechanism and electoral uncertainty. We characterize analytically a Markov perfect equilibrium and …nd that the joint between Markovian tax policy and tax distortion on private investment shapes an intertemporal policy rule linking taxes positively over time. The positive intertemporal tax linkage, by allowing current taxpayers to in ‡uence their own future social security bene…t, provides the political support for social security. Moreover, we …nd that a larger wage inequality weakens the intertemporal tax linkage and, thus, reduces inter-generational redistributive bene…t. This may lead to a smaller size of social security. Our theoretical predictions are in line with both time-series and cross-country correlations between inequality and social security.
Introduction
For most OECD countries, unfunded social security programs redistribute resources both across generations (from workers to retirees) and within generations (from the rich to the poor). 1 Since inter-and intra-generational redistributive elements are intertwined through a single policy instrument, the political choice on social security necessarily involves an interaction of redistributive considerations along both dimensions. Exploring this interaction would not only provide new insight on the politico-economic mechanism of social security, but also be interesting in light of two puzzling observations regarding inequality and welfare states. First, many cross-country empirical studies found virtually no, or even a negative relationship, between inequality and the size of welfare states. 2 Second, for many industrial democracies, wage inequality featured an upward shift during the 1980s and 1990s, while the growth of social security slowed down or even stopped. The archetypal case is the U.S.: The size of social security bene…t was cut back in the 1980s, whereas wage inequality increased sharply. 3 This paper, therefore, poses a twofold question: First, how is the social security system sustained? More precisely, given the temporal separation of contribution and bene…t, why do a majority of (self-interested) working generations contribute to the system, which redistributes to a minority of the old at any point in time? Second, how does inequality a¤ect the size of social security, and can political decisions be reconciled with the observed puzzling correlation between inequality and the size of social security, both across countries and across time periods?
While some theories have been proposed to address the …rst question, most of them have either been silent on the second or have delivered predictions opposite to the above empirical observations. In this paper, we take an answer to the second question as a natural check of the empirical relevance of our proposed theory.
To provide a stark framework for analyzing the sustainability of social security, we consider a dynamic political economy featuring the absence of altruism, commitment, reputation mechanism and electoral uncertainty (e.g., probabilistic voting). 4 In our model, self-interested forward-looking citizens vote repeatedly for a social security tax. Moreover, we focus exclusively on Markov perfect equilibria with the median voter being taxpayers. 1 For example, the original Social Security Act of 1935 in the U.S. embodied two principles that still guide bene…t payment today: Bene…t depends on the history of work in covered employment, and replaces a higher proportion of earnings for low earners. 2 See, for example, Perotti (1996) , Lindert (1996) and Rodriguez (1998) . 3 See Section 5 for a detailed discussion of the evidence. 4 These approaches have been widely adopted in the literature on the sustainability of social security.
Our model generates two key results. First, the impact of a current tax on future decisive voters'redistributive bene…t shapes an intertemporal tax linkage that implies positively correlated social security tax rates across time. The positive intertemporal tax linkage, by allowing the current median voter (taxpayers) to in ‡uence her own future pension bene…t, provides the incentive to support social security. Second, we …nd that a larger wage inequality weakens the intertemporal tax linkage and, thus, reduces inter-generational redistributive bene…t. This may lead to a smaller size of social security. As a result, our theoretical predictions regarding the correlation between wage inequality and the size of social security are in line with the above two empirical observations.
Our workhorse is a three-period overlapping-generation model. Individuals work in the …rst two periods of their lives and retire when old. They can invest in human capital at birth to increase productivity and, thus, wage income during both working periods -youth and middle-age. All individuals have linear utility on consumption, and human-capital investment involves a quadratic loss for the young. To incorporate intra-generational redistribution of social security, we introduce ex-ante within-cohort heterogeneity by assuming that each individual is born with either high or low ability and, therefore, receives either a high or a low wage rate for each unit of human capital. Taxes are imposed on wage income of the young and the middle-aged to …nance social security bene…t for the old. Each period, social security bene…t is uniformly distributed across di¤erent types of old agents, re ‡ecting the intra-generational redistributive feature of social security in unequal societies.
We solve for di¤erentiable Markov perfect equilibria in which the policy rule is a di¤er-entiable function of payo¤-relevant state variables. In the class of equilibria we consider, the middle-aged agents with a low wage, referred to as "the middle poor" henceforth, are always the median voter and decisive for the political choice on the social security tax. Accordingly, the payo¤-relevant state variable is the human-capital stock of the middle poor. As in standard theories, the human-capital stock of the middle poor negatively a¤ects their future social security bene…t, from both inter-and intra-generational redistribution, and, therefore, their tax choice. This establishes a Markovian policy rule, which links social security tax negatively to the human capital stock. Such a Markovian tax rule implies a standard e¤ect of wage inequality: A larger wage inequality leads to a higher tax since it relatively lowers humancapital investment and, thus, the human-capital stock of the poor. We refer to this e¤ect as the "redistributive e¤ect."
More importantly, the Markovian tax rule allows the current median voter to indirectly in ‡uence future political decisions. 5 Consider an increase in today's social security tax rate, which discourages the human-capital investment of the young. The Markovian tax rule implies a higher tax rate tomorrow due to more redistributive bene…t for tomorrow's decisive voters (the current young). In other words, the joint between the Markovian tax rule and private investment decisions creates a positive intertemporal tax linkage. Rationally perceiving this linkage, the current median voter understands that the more taxes she pays today, the more social security bene…t she will receive tomorrow. As a result, she may vote for a positive tax to trade o¤ her current tax burden against her future redistributive bene…t.
The intertemporal tax linkage reveals a novel channel through which intra-generational inequality a¤ects inter-generational redistributive bene…t and, thus, the size of social security.
In a society with larger wage inequality, the relatively lower wage rate for the poor dampens the impact of the current tax on human-capital investment of the young poor -the median voter in the next period. Consequently, the future tax becomes less responsive to the current one.
The weakened intertemporal tax linkage implies less inter-generational redistributive bene…t for the current median voter. Anticipating this, she will choose a lower tax. We label this e¤ect of wage inequality the "strategic e¤ect."
The presence of the strategic e¤ect generates surprising theoretical predictions. First, we …nd that a permanent positive shock to wage inequality leads to a contemporaneous cutback in social security. This is because upon impact, the human-capital stock of the middle poor is predetermined. As a result, the redistributive e¤ect is shut down and only the strategic e¤ect plays a role.
We then investigate the long-run relationship between wage inequality and social security.
In particular, we …nd that the steady-state tax rate is an inverted U-shaped function of wage inequality. A more unequal society may actually have a smaller steady-state size of social security if wage inequality is su¢ ciently large. Since both human capital and tax policies are endogenously determined in the long run, the long-run impact of wage inequality embodies both strategic and redistributive e¤ects. The negative correlation between inequality and social security originates from the dominant role of the strategic e¤ect with large inequality. Only after inequality falls below some critical level does the redistributive e¤ect start to overshadow the strategic e¤ect, rendering the correlation positive, as the standard theory implies.
The above predictions regarding both short-run and long-run e¤ects of wage inequality on social security are in line with empirical facts. For time-series evidence, we look at the U.S. case, for which a long span of high-quality data exists. Applying cointegration techniques, we …nd a negative long-run correlation between wage inequality and the size of social security bene…t in the U.S. Moreover, vector error-correction models con…rm that a rise in wage inequality reduces social security bene…t substantially in the short run. For example, our estimates indicate that the increase in wage inequality from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s can explain a large proportion of the observed decline in the size of social security bene…t from 1982 to the late 1980s. As a further check for the model's long-run implications, we use data on 19 OECD countries and, for each country, compute the average earnings inequality and social security size between 1980 and 2000. We …nd that countries with smaller earnings inequality have, on average, larger social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the political sustainability of social security in several aspects. One of the key issues is the temporal separation of contribution and bene…t.
The literature so far takes two approaches to address the issue. The …rst circumvents the temporal separation problem by assuming that the welfare of bene…t recipients weighs somehow in the preference of policy makers. 6 The second approach attempts to construct equilibria in which self-interested taxpayers support the system. However, the literature often resorts to ad hoc intertemporal policy rules. 7 In our model, the intertemporal tax linkage arises endogenously from the interaction between private decisions and political choices. Aside from theoretical appeal, the endogenous intertemporal tax linkage has also empirical relevance: The associated strategic e¤ect may cause a negative correlation between wage inequality and social security. By contrast, ad hoc intertemporal tax linkage assumes away the strategic e¤ect and, therefore, always predicts a positive correlation.
Another issue in the political sustainability of social security is the indeterminacy of political equilibria. In previous e¤orts to rationalize ad hoc intertemporal policy rules, future policy choices are often conditioned to variables that are payo¤-irrelevant for future policy makers.
This problem exists not only in trigger strategy equilibria, but also in some recent studies seeking to adopt the Markov strategy approach (see Azariadis and Galasso, 2002 and Forni, 2005 ). In our model, individuals today anticipate future policies according to future politico- 6 Examples of this sort include altruism, probabilistic voting (Gonzalez-Eires and Niepelt, 2008, Song, 2008) or gerontocracy (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1999) . 7 Speci…cally, previous work along this vein typically assumes that the future tax is related to the current tax in an ad hoc way. For example, in "once-and-for-all-voting,"the initial median voter expects future generations to commit fully to his choice of the tax for at least his lifetime (See, among others, Browning, 1975 and Conesa and Krueger, 1999) . In the "trigger strategy," though expectation of future policy choice is based on a system of rewards and punishments in an in…nite dynamic game, the choice of future generations is con…ned to either approving or rejecting the tax rate chosen in the initial period (See, among others, Cooley and Soares, 1999 and Boldrin and Rustichini, 1999) . economic fundamentals that are indeed payo¤-relevant for future median voters. Self-ful…lling expectations are, therefore, excluded. This, in turn, pins down the current policy as a function of the current payo¤-relevant state variable. Such a Markovian policy rule eliminates the indeterminacy of political equilibria and can provide testable empirical predictions. 8 This paper also contributes to the discussion on inequality and welfare states. Empirical studies (e.g., Lindert, 1996 and Rodriguez, 1998 ) have found a negative correlation between income inequality and the size of welfare states across the OECD. 9 Our paper provides additional support for this negative correlation from the perspective of social security, the largest part of government transfers. Moreover, our time-series evidence contributes to the literature by showing both a short-run and a long-run negative correlation between wage inequality and social security in the U.S. On theoretical grounds, the literature attempts to explain the negative correlation by focusing on roles other than redistribution say, social insurance under incomplete markets (e.g., Benabou, 2000 and Moene and Wallerstein, 2001 ). As a complement to the literature, our theory shows that in the context of social security, the negative correlation can well be explained by the strategic e¤ect through which intra-generational inequality may a¤ect inter-generational redistributive bene…t. 10 Our work is part of a growing literature on dynamic politico-economic equilibrium, in which current voting may change future politico-economic fundamentals and, hence, a¤ect future policy outcomes. 11 The methodology used in this paper is closely related to Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003, henceforth HRSZ) . HRSZ analyze the dynamics of the welfare state in Markov perfect equilibria allowing closed-form solutions. In their paper, the current median voter can vote strategically to in ‡uence the identity of the median voter in the following period. This gives rise to an intertemporal policy linkage similar to that in our model. We share with HRSZ in the methodology to build up the intertemporal policy 8 Previous studies suggest that the fundamental linkage between policy choices and payo¤-relevant state variables may help to overcome the indeterminacy of equilibria. For example, McCallum (1983) …nds that in a wide class of linear rational expectation models, non-uniqueness of solutions occurs because unnecessary or 'extraneous' components are permitted to in ‡uence expected (and, therefore, actual) values of endogenous variables. Maskin and Tirole (2001) argue that Markov perfect equilibrium, by preventing non-payo¤-relevant variables from a¤ecting strategic behavior, is often successful in eliminating or reducing a large multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic games. 9 One exception is Tabellini (2000) , which, by applying cross-country regression for more than 40 countries, …nds that the size of social security systems is positively correlated with income inequality. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 6), however, note that the measure of inequality is bound to be imperfect for such a large sample of countries.
1 0 Note that if the old and the rich workers form a coalition, it might be possible to generate a negative correlation between inequality and the size of social security. However, this implies either a regressive tax or a convex bene…t function of contribution, which is counterfactual. 1 rule and characterize analytically Markov perfect equilibrium. However, their model economy does not feature a temporal separation of redistributive contribution and bene…t because, by construction, the decisive voter must be the transfer recipient (the old). Therefore, unlike our model, theirs exhibits no strategic e¤ects. The correlation between wage inequality and the size of welfare states simply depends on whether the old poor or the old rich are decisive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment and the Ramsey solution regarding policy choices. The political equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 examines the impact of wage inequality on social security. Section 5 discusses the empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality and social security. Section 6 concludes.
The Model Economy
Consider a small open economy inhabited by an in…nite sequence of overlapping generations.
Each generation lives three periods. An individual works in the …rst two periods of her life and retires in the last. Labor supply in each of the …rst two periods is inelastic and normalized to unity. The young can make human-capital investment to increase labor productivity.
There is heterogeneity within each cohort. Individuals are born with either high or low ability. High-(low-) ability individuals receive a high (low) wage rate per unit of human capital, denoted as w s (w u ). For notational convenience, agents with high (low) ability will be referred to as the rich (the poor). Let h j t be the human-capital investment of a young individual born at time t with type j, j = s; u. Human capital and wage income at both working ages equal h j t and w j h j t , respectively. 12 We consider a pay-as-you-go social security system. The ‡at-rate payroll tax rate t is determined through a political process that will be speci…ed below. t is imposed on working generations to …nance social security bene…t. In reality, social security systems contain both actuarial and redistributive components. For analytical convenience, in this dynamic model we take the degree of actuarial fairness as exogenously given, rather than as a political choice.
This assumption also captures the idea that, in reality, the degree of actuarial fairness of a social security system is more stable over time than the contribution rate, which may well adjust annually. 13 In addition to inter-generational transfers, our pay-as-you-go social security system also bears intra-generational redistributive elements. More speci…cally, following Conesa and Krueger (1999) and many others, we assume that social security bene…t is evenly distributed among old individuals (i.e. "non-actuarially fair"). 14 Then, the lifetime wealth A j t follows
where p t+2 stands for social security bene…t per retiree born at time t.
To obtain closed-form solutions, we assume agents to have a linear-quadratic preference over lifetime wealth and costs of human-capital investment:
subject to (1) . Solving (2) yields
For each type j, human-capital investment increases in wage rate and decreases in tax rates.
(2) deserves comment. By assuming the linear preference, we actually shut down private saving and therefore the interaction between savings and social security. However, as will be shown below, the human-capital investment in our model plays essentially the same role as savings in the determination of social security; less human-capital investment (or savings) today leads to more social security bene…t tomorrow. An extension of the present model by incorporating the intertemporal choice on consumption, therefore, will only complicate the analysis and add no major new insight. 15 The proportion of the poor is a constant in each cohort. We assume 1=2 so that the poor are the majority of the population. The weighted average wage incomes for the cohort born at time t, denoted by w t , are equal to
The …rst equality is due to the fact that the middle-aged have the same productivity as when they are young.
Assume that the gross population growth rate is a constant n > 1. Plugging (3) into (4), we obtain the output per retiree, which will be useful in the analysis below:
1 4 Our results on both the political sustainability and the size of social security do not change qualitatively if we assume a more actuarially fair system. 1 5 In an earlier version of this paper, we show that the mechanism emphasized here also applies in a model with private savings, which gives qualitatively the same results as below.
Here, we normalize (w u ) 2 + (1 ) (w s ) 2 to unity so that wage inequality has no …rst-order e¤ect on the tax base. 16 We also use the fact that h s t 1 =h u t 1 = w s =w u ; implied by (3) . The output per retiree y t is the current tax base for social security bene…t. It is also convenient to have the future tax base y t+1 , which is determined by h j t and h j t+1 and, hence, t , t+1 and
where
Note that y t+1 is independent of the current human-capital stock h j t 1 . We assume that the budget of the social security system must balance in each period. This implies that in each period, total bene…t paid to the old equal total contribution collected from working generations:
The size of the social security system, as measured by the share of total social security bene…t in total output, p t =y t ; is equal to t in this simple model. Hence, the ‡ip sides of the sustainability and the size of social security are the sustainability of a positive t and its level.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (1), the indirect utility functions of the middle-aged and old of type j, denoted by v m;j and v o;j , can be written as
Note that v o;s = v o;u since social security bene…t p t+1 are evenly distributed across retirees.
Ramsey Allocation
In this subsection, we characterize the Ramsey allocation in which a utilitarian planner with a commitment technology sets the sequence of tax rates f t g 1 t=0 so as to maximize a social welfare function. Our purpose is twofold. First, we show that under the linear quadratic utility, wage inequality has no e¤ect on the steady-state tax rate; nor does it a¤ect taxes along the transition path to the steady state. Second, due to tax distortion, it is optimal to eliminate social security in the long run if the economy satis…es the modi…ed Golden Rule. Accordingly, our model shares the same normative implication for the e¢ ciency of social security as the standard theory has. 1 6 Alternatively, we can normalize the average wage rate to unity by letting w s = (1
. This leads to no major change in the following results.
Speci…cally, we assume that there is a planner maximizing the sum of the discounted utilities of all generations with a social discount factor . We also assume that t cannot exceed 1, but can be negative. The negative t refers to the redistribution from retirees to working generations. Appendix 7.1 speci…es the Ramsey problem and characterizes the solution. An immediate …nding is that the linearity of utility over consumption gives the planner no incentive for intra-generational redistribution. This explains why tax is independent of wage inequality in the Ramsey allocation, both at the steady state and along the transitional path.
It is also instructive to see the normative implications of the model in a special case with = n=R. The condition, often labeled as the modi…ed Golden Rule, implies that the planner weighs generations by their relative sizes and discounts their welfare by the interest rate. In Appendix 7.1, we prove that the tax rate converges to zero. The intuition is simple. At the steady state, the marginal rate of substitution of the planner between consumption of two consecutive generations, R, is already equal to the marginal rate of transformation n. So, there is no further room for inter-generational redistribution. In addition, the linearity of preference over consumption implies no need for intra-generational redistribution. Therefore,
given the presence of tax distortions, it is optimal not to impose a positive social security tax in the long run. 17 In short, we show that wage inequality does not a¤ect the social security tax if there is a benevolent planner, and the normative implications of our model economy are in line with those in the existing literature. This warm-up exercise indicates that the sustainability and the e¤ect of wage inequality on social security in political equilibrium, as will be shown below, stem from a lack of commitment and con ‡icts of interests across di¤erent groups of individuals.
Political Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the political equilibrium, in which the social security tax rate 1 7 We also discuss a more general case in which 2 [1=R; n=R] in the appendix. 1 8 Our model can potentially be extended to allow individuals to vote each period for the degree of actuarial fairness of the system, together with the tax rate. In a similar environment but with only a one-shot game and no intergenerational con ‡icts, Cremer, Donder, Maldonado and Pestieau (2007) show that given the poor as the median voter, a non-actuarially fair social security system (Beveridgean system) will be chosen if all voters are either far-sighted or myopic, or there is perfect substitutability of consumption across periods. This is because, compared to an actuarially fair system (Bismarckian system), the redistributive bene…t from a Beveridgean system dominates its distortion on labor supply. Therefore, our conjecture is that a non-actuarially fair system will be chosen each period in our economy, in which all individuals are far-sighted, and there is perfect substutability of consumption across periods in utility. restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria, where t follows a policy rule T contingent on payo¤-relevant state variables. For analytical convenience, we further assume T to be continuous and di¤erentiable. The corresponding equilibrium is referred to as the di¤erentiable Markov perfect equilibrium (DMPE henceforth). 19 
Di¤erentiable Markov Perfect Equilibrium
There are two state variables at time t, human-capital stock h s t 1 and h u t 1 . Since h s t 1 =h u t 1 = w s =w u ; we can, without loss of generality, con…ne the payo¤-relevant state variable to h u t 1 . The Markovian policy rule T can, thus, be written as as a function of h u t 1 only:
and h w u (1 + 1=R) (1 ) are the lower and upper bound of h u 1 , respectively. We drop time subscript when there is no source of confusion. Let 1 and < 0; as in the Ramsey solution. Plugging (10) into (3) with j = u,
we have
Given T; equation (11) solves the human capital investment decision of the young poor H :
[ ; ] ! h; h . The presence of the intertemporal tax linkage allows the current policy decision maker to indirectly in ‡uence future political decisions. Although there is no commitment to future policy outcomes, private investment provides a channel through which can in ‡uence 0 . Moreover, the derivative of B captures the degree to which the future tax responds to the current one:
A combination of T and H yields
We refer to B 0 ( ) as the magnitude of the intertemporal tax linkage. Clearly, the larger is B 0 ( ), the more easily the current tax can in ‡uence the future one. In the extreme case where B 0 ( ) = 0, there is no access for current voters to a¤ect future legislation.
Now we specify the political decision process. Consider a Downsian electoral competition in which there are two candidates (or parties) with the aim of winning the election. 20 The political choice on solves = arg max
subject to 0 = B ( ). v dec is the indirect utility function of the decisive voter. For analytical simplicity, we assume that young agents do not vote. This assumption can be rationalized by the fact that the older generations are more in ‡uential in the determination of public policies. 21 (8) and (9) show that the political choice of depends only on h u 1 , irrespective of which group is decisive. De…ne =T h u 1 as the solution of (14) . T is an equilibrium policy rule if and only if T =T . The de…nition of the equilibrium is given by 
The Median Voter
This subsection shows that the median voter is always the middle poor in our model economy.
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that the strategic interaction between private intertemporal choice and policy decisions can, in principle, switch the identity of the median voter over time. 4) proves that the identity of the median voter is constant over time in DMPE. The intuition is as follows. When the identity of the median voter changes over time, we will observe di¤erent political regimes in equilibrium. This leads to a discontinuous or non-di¤erentiable policy rule T . Therefore, the technical restriction that the policy function must be di¤erentiable actually amounts to imposing a constant
In the following analysis, we …rst propose that the middle poor are decisive, and then check the validity of this assumption. Let m;s , m;u and o be the preferred tax rate of the middle rich, the middle poor and the old, respectively, under the expectation that the middle poor will be decisive in the future. Given the majority of the middle-aged among voters and the majority of the poor within the cohort, the following condition is su¢ cient for the middle poor to be the median voter:
for any h u 1 2 h; h . The …rst inequality is straightforward. Since the middle rich receive the same social security bene…t as the middle poor while paying more taxes, they always prefer a lower tax rate than the middle poor. So, we only need to check the second inequality in (15) .
We will show in Section 3.4 below that m;u o holds for a wide range of parameter values.
The intuition is simple. The middle-aged, as taxpayers, prefer a lower tax rate than the old, who bear no tax burden. 23 
Political Choice
We now investigate how the tax rate is chosen by the middle poor. It immediately follows that T (h u ) = 0 for all h u 2 h; h trivially satis…es the conditions in De…nition 1 and (15).
To avoid the uninteresting result, we focus on equilibria in which T (h u ) 6 = 0 at least for some
For notational convenience, we write the future tax base (6) in a recursive formulation.
respective of the value of B 0 ( ). That is to say, increasing always reduces the future tax base for social security bene…t payment.
The tax choice of the middle poor can, thus, be expressed as
(1 )
The …rst term in the objective function is the after-tax wage incomes, and the second term represents the discounted future bene…t from social security. The …rst-order condition is
identity of the decisive voters over time. 2 3 Moreover, the current tax base y for redistribution towards the old is less elastic with respect to than the future tax base y 0 for redistribution towards the current middle-aged.
where the LHS (RHS) of (18) captures the marginal cost (bene…t) of taxation for the middle poor. According to (18) , the middle poor choose a tax rate so as to trade o¤ their current tax burden against their future redistributive bene…t. We suppress two multipliers associated with the constraints and since corner solutions have been ruled out by the di¤erentiability of T ( ). 24 Equation (18) reveals both the necessary conditions for the sustainability of social security and the determinants of its size. First, as Y 0 ( ) < 0, one can see from (18) that B 0 ( ) > 0 is necessary for > . As taxpayers, the middle poor would vote for the lowest tax rate on themselves, if future bene…t were independent of or even negatively correlated with their contribution. Hence, a positive intertemporal tax linkage is a prerequisite for sustaining social security. 25 To better understand the determinants of the size of social security, we make a slight rearrangement of (18) .
where wh 1
=R is the average wage income of the cohort born at time t 1: The positive intertemporal tax linkage, which is necessary for sustaining social security, implies that the LHS of (19) is increasing in . A special case for (19) is its steady-state formulation, where B ( ) = . Hence, this rearrangement allows us to focus on those governing the magnitude of the RHS as the determinants of social security size.
The second equality in (19) demonstrates that social security bene…t can be decomposed into two parts. The …rst is an inter-generational redistributive component, as represented by
More precisely, this term re ‡ects the marginal future social security bene…t for the middle-aged with respect to the current tax, if there is no intra-generational inequality. Notably, the marginal inter-generational redistributive bene…t is increasing in B 0 ( ), the magnitude of the intertemporal tax linkage. This is because, given a marginal increase 2 4 If the constraints are binding for some h u 1 2 h; h , then must be equal to 0 or for all h u 1 2 h; h by the di¤erentiability of T . If T ( ) = , B 0 ( ) = 0. Then (18) implies that = 0. Contradiction. T ( ) = 0, on the other hand, is a trivial equilibrium. 2 5 A special case is that B 0 ( ) = 1: Then, the economy essentially goes back to the case of once-and-for-allvoting or trigger strategies, in the sense that future generations will obey the current choice of tax rate. More generally, B 0 ( ) = 1 may be interpreted as the situation in which there is no temporal separation between bene…t and contribution (i.e., for each individual both social security contribution and bene…t payment occur in the same period).
in the current tax, a higher B 0 ( ) yields a higher future tax rate and, therefore, more social security bene…t for the current middle-aged. The second part is an intra-generational redistributive component, as represented by wh 1 w u h u 1 . Since social security bene…t is uniformly distributed across retirees in our model, the lower are wage incomes of the poor, the more social security redistributes from the rich to the poor. Now, we investigate the determinants of social security size in order. First of all, (19) implies that is positively a¤ected by B 0 ( ) and Y ( ). This is because a larger magnitude of the intertemporal tax linkage, B 0 ( ), or a larger future tax base, Y ( ), implies more intergenerational redistributive bene…t for the middle-aged. In addition, a larger tax distortion Y 0 ( ) tends to decrease . This e¤ect shows up in many standard static or dynamic models (e.g., Metzler and Richard, 1981, and Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1999). Furthermore, given a positive B 0 ( ), is increasing in wage inequality, as the standard theory predicts. A larger wage inequality yields a lower pretax income for the middle poor, w u h u . The lower marginal cost of taxation leads to a stronger redistributive incentive and, therefore, a higher tax rate today.
Note that previous studies often resort to some exogenous intertemporal policy rules (i.e., B 0 ( ) is given as a parameter), such as reputation mechanism or once-and-for-all voting, to sustain social security. Our analysis above shows that these studies imply a positive correlation between wage inequality and the size of social security, which, as we discuss later, is counterfactual.
In brief, we have shown that a positive intertemporal tax linkage is crucial for the political sustainability of social security. Another important …nding is that the magnitude of the intertemporal tax linkage a¤ects the inter-generational redistributive bene…t for the decisive voter and, therefore, the political choice on social security size. Now, we would like to characterize analytically this intertemporal policy linkage, as well as the corresponding equilibrium outcomes.
Equilibrium Policy Rules
In this section, we provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of DMPE and then characterize the equilibrium. Thanks to the quasi-linear preference, closed-form solutions for equilibrium policy rules can easily be obtained.
Proposition 1 Assume that
and
(see the appendix for the de…nition of b 0 , b 1 , 0 and 1 ). Then, there exists a DMPE such that the middle poor is the median voter and
Proof. See the appendix.
The …rst part of the proposition describes technical assumptions for the existence of a DMPE, in which the middle poor are always the median voter. (20) and (21) (22) is a su¢ cient condition for the second inequality in (15) to be satis…ed, i.e., the old always prefer a higher tax rate than the middle poor. In other words, this assumption makes sure that the middle poor are always the decisive voter. 27 Therefore, if = 0, an economy satisfying these assumptions can sustain social security in a DMPE. for a large set of w u and n. An immediate observation is that social security can be sustained in a dynamic e¢ cient economy (R > n), as long as wage inequality is not too low, i.e., w u is not too high. Intuitively, the political sustainability of social security originates from both inter-generational and intra-generational redistributive incentives. In a more unequal society, the poor are more willing to support social security for intra-generational redistribution. 2 6 Given (20), the middle poor would like to choose tax rates higher than for any ht 1 2 h; h . (21) ensures that t is not binding. Since T 0 ( ) < 0, the minimum (maximum) value of t is located at ht 1 = h (h). 2 7 Note that (22) is more likely to hold by a higher h (or a lower ). This is because m;u decreases in h 1, while the old tend to impose a higher tax rate with a larger inelastic human capital stock h 1. The combination of H 0 ( ) < 0 and T 0 ( ) < 0 establishes our positive intertemporal tax linkage, the cornerstone for the political sustainability of social security in our model economy. To see the underlying politico-economic mechanism more clearly, consider an increase in today's tax rate. H 0 ( ) < 0 leads to a lower human-capital investment of the young. Then T 0 ( ) < 0 implies a higher tax rate tomorrow due to more redistributive bene…t for tomorrow's decisive voters (the current young). Rationally perceiving the linkage, the current middle poor understand that the more taxes they pay today, the more social security bene…t they will receive tomorrow. This provides the incentive for the current middle poor to choose a positive tax rate.
The following corollary characterizes the dynamics of the size of social security.
Corollary 1 Let = 0 and assume (20) , (21) and (22) . In the DMPE, we have b 0 0 and
The social security tax rates monotonically converge to the steady state
Suppose that the political decision process on social security occurs unanticipatedly at time 0. Then, the above corollary predicts an increasing sequence of social security tax rates over time, which converge to the steady state rate b 0 = (1 b 1 ) . To see this, note that the middle poor at time 0 invested more in human capital than the middle poor in subsequent periods, due to an expectation of zero taxes before time 0. Consequently, the initial tax rate chosen by the initial middle poor is actually the lowest in the dynamics. Moreover, the initial positive tax distorts the human-capital investment of the second-period middle poor so that they end up with less human capital than the initial-period middle poor. This encourages them to choose a tax rate higher than the initial one. A similar argument applies to the political choice afterwards and, thus, explains why tax rates in later periods increase monotonically towards a steady state.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the DMPE characterized by Proposition 1 is determinate. 28 This contrasts sharply with the indeterminacy of linear Markov equilibria in Azariadis and Galasso (2002), though their model has a number of common features with ours (e.g., the linear technology, the temporal separation of contribution and bene…t and a lack of commitment). The reason is that, in their model, the political sustainability relies solely on a selfful…lling expectation of future social security bene…t that is independent of politico-economic fundamentals. 29 By contrast, the political choice in our model depends on human capital stock h u 1 , which is indeed payo¤-relevant for the policy decision maker. Such a Markovian policy rule excludes the indeterminacy of equilibria. Therefore, our model can deliver testable implications for the correlation between wage inequality and the size of social security, as we will 2 8 Although we cannot analytically rule out nonlinear solutions, numerical simulations show that the equilibrium strategy in a space of nonlinear functions indeed converges to the linear one (23) . The computational strategy adopts a standard projection method with Chebyshev collocation (Judd, 1992) , to approximate the equilibrium strategy on the basis of a high-order polynomial functional space. 2 9 Azariadis and Galasso (2002) …nd indeterminate equilibria in which the young, as the median voter, conditions their voting choices on the capital stock of the old. However, in their two-period OG model with linear technology, capital held by the old is payo¤-irrelevant for the young median voter. A related but somewhat di¤erent problem can also be found in Forni (2005) , which uses capital as the state in a general equilibrium framework. In his model, capital per se does not a¤ect the median voter's tax choices due to the log utility speci…cation. Consequently, current capital stock a¤ects the current policy choice if and only if the current median voter expects that the choice of the next-period tax rate relies on the next-period capital stock.
show in the next section.
E¤ects of Wage Inequality
Now, we would like to address the second key question of this paper: how wage inequality a¤ects the size of social security, in both the short run and the long run. The answer to this question provides testable implications, which can be confronted with the empirical observations. Our analysis takes two steps. First, we explore the potential channels for wage inequality to a¤ect tax choice. In particular, we identify two opposite e¤ects of wage inequality on the size of social security. We then ask how wage inequality a¤ects tax choice through these two e¤ects.
The Strategic E¤ect and the Redistributive E¤ect
It is useful to de…ne a benchmark social security tax rate:
where b h u = w u (1 + 1=R) is the …rst-best human capital investment of the middle poor. We refer to^ as the "baseline tax rate".^ is the minimum tax rate implied by the Markovian tax rule T when = 0. 30 Later on, we will show that the actual tax rate in the steady state is equal to the product of the baseline tax rate and a multiplier.
The impact of wage inequality on the baseline tax rate can be expressed as (28) Equation (28) shows that wage inequality a¤ects the baseline tax rate^ through two channels, as represented by the two arguments in the RHS of (28) . The …rst channel is via 0 and 1 in the Markovian tax rule T , while the second is via its e¤ect on human capital stock.
We …rst explore the second channel. It is straightforward that b h u is increasing in w u . Since 1 < 0; the positive impact of w u on b h u implies that an increase in w u tends to reduce the baseline tax rate. Intuitively, a lower w u yields a lower …rst-best human-capital investment, which leads to more redistributive bene…t and, therefore, a higher preferred tax rate of tomorrow's decisive voters. This is referred to as the "redistributive e¤ect," which has been extensively investigated in the standard politico-economic theory.
The e¤ect of w u through 0 and 1 , two parameters governing the Markovian tax rule, is a novel feature of our model. This channel actually implies a negative e¤ect of wage inequality on the size of social security. To see this, we …rst explore the e¤ect of w u on b 1 , a key determinant for inter-generational redistributive bene…t. The following lemma reveals a negative correlation between wage inequality and the magnitude of the intertemporal tax linkage b 1 . (20), (21) and (22) . Then, @b 1 =@w u > 0.
Lemma 1 Assume

Proof. See the appendix.
A larger wage inequality lowers the absolute value of h 1 , as the relatively lower wage rate for the poor dampens the impact of the current tax on human-capital investment of the young poor. This is the …rst-order e¤ect of w u on b 1 , resulting in a weakened intertemporal tax linkage. Therefore, Lemma 1 establishes a negative e¤ect of wage inequality on b 1 and, hence, on the inter-generational redistributive bene…t illustrated in (19) . The above lemma helps to explain how the Markovian tax rule T responds to a change of w u . (20), (21) and (22) . Then, @ 0 =@w u > 0 and @ 1 =@w u > 0.
Proposition 2 Assume
Proposition 2, together with equation (27) , shows that given human-capital stock h u 1 , wage inequality has a negative e¤ect on the choice of . This is because an increase in wage inequality can actually reduce inter-generational redistributive bene…t for the current policy decision maker by weakening the intertemporal tax linkage. Anticipating this, she will therefore choose a lower tax. We label this negative impact of wage inequality on via equilibrium policy rules, captured by 0 and 1 in (28), as the "strategic e¤ect."
The two opposite e¤ects of wage inequality make the sign of @^ =@w u ambiguous. In (28) ; the …rst argument is positive due to the positive e¤ect of w u on 0 and 1 . By contrast, the second argument is negative since 1 < 0. As Panel A of Figure 2 shows,^ is hump-shaped in w u . 31 In other words, when wage inequality is su¢ ciently large, there exists a negative relationship between wage inequality and the baseline tax rate. Only after inequality falls below some critical level does the correlation between inequality and the baseline tax rate become positive. Panel B of Figure 2 plots the relative magnitude of the two e¤ects for di¤erent levels of wage inequality. We see that when w u is small, the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect is large and dominates the redistributive e¤ect. As w u keeps increasing, the strategic e¤ect becomes smaller. This is because the current tax becomes more distortionary via a larger b 1 : An increase of today's tax leads to a larger increase of tomorrow's tax, which distorts further the current human-capital investment. Consequently, the redistributive e¤ect starts to dominate when w u becomes su¢ ciently large. 
Permanent Shock to Wage Inequality
Our strategic e¤ect generates some novel predictions regarding the impacts of wage inequality on the size of social security. We …rst investigate how permanent shocks to wage inequality a¤ect the secular movement of social security size. Since the human-capital stock of the middle poor is predetermined, the redistributive e¤ect of shocks to wage inequality is shut down upon impact. In other words, only the strategic e¤ect plays a role when such a shock hits the economy.
Let us consider a permanent increase in wage inequality. Our experiment is as follows.
Suppose that the economy is at the steady state in period 0. At the beginning of period 1,
there is an unexpected increase in wage inequality. It is followed by the political decision process on at time 1. Figure 3 plots the transition path with the permanent shock to wage inequality. 32 We see that the tax rate drops sharply following a widening of the wage gap and, then, gradually increases towards a new steady state, the level of which will be discussed 3 2 In Figure 3 , we set R = 1:025 30 , = 0:5, n = 1:38, w u = 0:4 and 0:36 before and after the shock.
below. 33 The intuition is simple. When wage inequality suddenly increases, the middle poor at period 1 will vote for a lower tax rate than that in the initial steady state, as driven by the strategic e¤ect highlighted in (28) . Moreover, the young poor at period 1 reduce human-capital investment due to the lower wage rate. 34 The lower human-capital stock will then encourage the middle poor at period 2 to choose a higher tax than at period 1. This will discourage further human-capital investment of the young poor at period 2, which translates into a higher tax rate at period 3. Similar logic applies to all future periods. 
The Steady-State Size of Social Security
We now extend the analysis to the impact of wage inequality on the steady-state tax rate. 35 The linear intertemporal tax linkage (25) delivers a steady-state tax rate of
Note that b 0 represents the component of the next-period tax that is independent of the current tax. Equation (46) in the appendix shows that
The …rst component in the RHS of (30) is the baseline tax rate in (27) . The second component is a multiplier of the baseline tax rate, representing the repercussions of a future tax on itself via human-capital investment. Speci…cally, an increase in future taxation distorts human-capital investment today, which translates into a lower human-capital stock and, thus, a higher tax rate tomorrow.
Substituting (30) into (29), we obtain
Similar to b 0; can be decomposed into two components. The …rst component in the RHS of (31) is, again, the baseline tax rate. The second component is a multiplier of the baseline tax rate, representing the repercussions of the current tax on . Speci…cally, with a positive b 1 , a marginal increase in the current tax leads to a higher future tax rate by discouraging humancapital investment today. The higher future taxation discourages human-capital investment further and, thus, feedbacks into a higher steady-state tax rate.
The overall e¤ects of wage inequality can be decomposed as follows:
The …rst term in the RHS of (32) captures the e¤ect of w u on the baseline tax rate, and the second term is the e¤ect of w u via the multiplier. The second term is always positive, while the sign of the …rst term is ambiguous due to the two opposite e¤ects of w u on^ . In particular, we …nd that in our numerical experiments, is non-monotonically related to w u . Figure 4 shows an inverted-U shaped correlation between w u and . 36 The hump shape is due primarily to the hump shape of the baseline tax rate depicted in Figure 2 . Finally, it is worth mentioning how the demographic structure a¤ects the size of social security in our model. Following the same procedure as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can easily establish that @b 1 =@n < 0. Although a larger n weakens the intertemporal tax linkage as a lower w u , it directly increases inter-generational redistributive bene…t. Our numerical simulation suggests that the direct e¤ect always dominates the strategic e¤ect via b 1 . Therefore, our model delivers results that are qualitatively similar to those in the standard theory; i.e., a high dependency ratio leads to a larger size of social security.
Empirical Evidence
Can the above-mentioned theoretical predictions be consistent with the empirical observations?
Note that the key element driving our model predictions, the intertemporal tax linkage, also stands as the core to sustain social security in our economy. Therefore, an answer to this ques-tion serves as a natural test of our theory versus alternative mechanisms for the sustainability of social security.
In this section, we provide some evidence on the correlations between wage inequality and the size of social security. We …rst look at the time-series evidence from the U.S. Using cointegration techniques and error-correction models, we …nd a negative long-run relation in the U.S. Moreover, the size of social security responds negatively to shocks on inequality in the short run. We then look at averaged data on 19 OECD countries from 1980 to 2000 as a further check. Consistent with Perotti (1996) and Lindert (1998) , among others, we …nd no evidence supporting a positive correlation between inequality and redistribution. All of these empirical …ndings are in line with our model predictions, while it is hard to explain by the standard theory.
Time-series Evidence
For many industrial democracies, earnings inequality featured an upward shift during the 1980s and 1990s, while the size of redistributive programs grew less quickly (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2000) . This observation also holds for social security, which is, by far, the largest redistributive program in most OECD countries. In this subsection, we document the time-series evidence from the U.S. during the period from 1963 to 2003, a period for which high-quality data on both earnings inequality and social security are available. 37 The history of the U.S. social security program can be divided into two periods: an expansionary period lasting about 40 years, followed by a period of contraction. Panel B of Figure 5 plots the evolution of full-time hourly wage inequality, measured by the ratio of the log median earnings to the upper limit of the log earnings in the 9th decile of the earnings distribution, denoted by D5=D1. 40 We see that wage inequality took o¤ in the late 1970s and kept growing until the mid 1980s. Since then, wage inequality has persistently remained at a high level. 41 In short, the persistent rise in wage inequality precedes the decline in the size of the social security program, indicating a negative correlation between inequality and social security in the short run. We establish this negative correlation by a more careful time-series analysis. Social security bene…t is closely related to demographic structure. So, we include the dependency ratio (DEP henceforth) in the analysis. Using cointegration techniques, we …nd that D5=D1 has a signi…cantly negative impact on SSB, suggesting a negative long-run correlation between inequality and social security. 42 The dependency ratio (DEP ) is positively correlated with SSB, as expected.
We then proceed by estimating vector error correction (VEC) models describing the shortrun dynamics of SSB. The results suggest a convergence of SSB to the long-run equilibrium relationship. To see explicitly the short-run dynamics of SSB, Figure 6 plots the impulse response function of SSB with respect to a one-percentage increase in wage inequality based on an estimated VEC model. 43 The …gure shows that the rise of wage inequality results in a decline of SSB, which peaks in the sixth year after the inequality shock. Consistent with our simulation result in Figure 3 , the impulse response of SSB also exhibits overshooting upon the shock to wage inequality. Moreover, the impact of shocks to inequality is quantitatively important in the short run. Note that D5=D1 increased by about eight percentage points from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. According to the estimates in Figure 6 , such a shock would cut SSB by 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent in …ve or six years. This can explain a large share of the observed 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent decline of SSB from 1982 to the late 1980s. The evidence on the short-run impact of permanent shocks to wage inequality on social security provides support for the strategic e¤ect implied by our model.
Cross-Country Evidence
In this subsection, we look at cross-country data as a further check. There are a number of empirical studies addressing the question of whether higher distributional skewness makes the constituency favor more redistributive legislation, following the work pioneered by Meltzer and Richard (1981) . Our perspective is slightly di¤erent from that of the literature, with a focus on earnings inequality and the size of social security.
To deal with problems of data quality and comparability, we limit our cross-country analysis to a set of 19 OECD countries with reliable data on both earnings inequality and social security transfers. OECD national account statistics provides the ratio of the median earnings to the In summary, both our time-series and cross-country evidence suggests negative correla- 4 4 Earnings are measured on a gross basis, i.e., before deduction of income taxes and social security contribution paid by workers. They include basic wages and salaries, overtime payments, bonuses and gratuities, extra monthly payments, and regular and irregular allowances, but may exclude elements of the remuneration package of managers and other executives, such as stock options. 
Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic politico-economic theory of social security to address two questions. First, how is social security sustained by a majority of (self-interested) working generations? Second, can political decisions be reconciled with the observed puzzling negative correlation between inequality and the size of social security, both across countries and across time periods? To this end, our model features the absence of altruism, commitment, reputation mechanism and electoral uncertainty. And we focus exclusively on Markov perfect equilibria with the median voter being taxpayers, Our major …nding is that the joint between Markovian tax policy and tax distortion on private investment shapes an intertemporal policy rule that links social security taxes positively over time. This intertemporal policy linkage not only serves as the key element in the political sustainability of social security, but also reveals a novel channel through which intragenerational inequality negatively a¤ects inter-generational redistributive bene…t and, thus, the size of social security. Thanks to the presence of this novel channel, our theoretical predictions are in line with the empirical observations. Our work, therefore, contrasts sharply with most previous studies, which imply opposite predictions by resorting to some ad-hoc intertemporal policy rule for sustaining social security in similar environments. Furthermore, the mechanism described in this paper has the potential to explain other social programs that are characterized by temporal separation of contribution and bene…t.
One example is the government-sponsored health insurance program. An investigation into the sustainability and the evolution of such programs might be fruitful as they are growing fast and 
where u = , s = 1
is the discount factor of the planner on the welfare of all generations born after time 0. That is, the utilitarian planner discounts each successive cohort with a factor . h j 1 is the predetermined average human capital of the initial middle-aged.
We assume that t cannot exceed one, but can be negative. A negative t refers to the intergenerational redistribution from the old to working generations. For analytical convenience, we focus on interior solutions. (33) is a standard sequential problem. Note that the derivatives @h j t ( t ; t+1 ) =@ t = w j , @h j t ( t ; t+1 ) =@ t+1 = w j =R, @y t+1 ( t ; t+1 ; t+2 ) =@ t = n, @y t+1 ( t ; t+1 ; t+2 ) =@ t+1 = n (n + 1=R) and @y t+1 ( t ; t+1 ; t+2 ) =@ t+2 = n 2 =R are time-invariant.
For any t with t 2, the …rst-order condition is
(34) yields a second-order linear di¤erence equation after some algebra
where 1 2 n=R n 2 =R 2 =R, 2 2 + =R 2 2n (n + 1=R) =R 2 , 3 1 = and (1 + 1=R) ( + 1=R) n (1 + n) (1 + 1=R) =R 2 . It immediately follows from (34) or (35) that the Ramsey allocation is independent of w u and . Intuitively, the linearity of consumption implies that the planner has no incentive for intra-generational redistribution.
This explains why the social security tax is independent of wage inequality.
To understand further the determinants of long-run taxes in the Ramsey allocation, we consider two special cases of the discount factor: = n=R and = 1=R. The …rst case implies that the planner weighs generations by their relative sizes and discounts their welfare by the interest rate. In the second, the planner discounts the utility of future generations more than the market rate. Assume the economy to be dynamic e¢ cient so that < 1 holds.
Proposition 3
In the Ramsey allocation, we have
(1) If = 1=R, the tax rate converges to a positive R 2 (0; 1) in an oscillatory way, where
(2) If = n=R, the tax rate converges to zero in an oscillatory way.
Proof.
(1) The steady-state tax rate in the Ramsey allocation R is solved by substituting R for t in (34) . Substituting = 1=R into , it is immediate that < 0, 1 < 0, 2 < 0 and 3 < 0 by n > 1. Moreover, j j < j 1 + 2 + 3 j. So R 2 (0; 1). The eigenvalues of (35) We have discussed in the text the intuition of the result when = n=R. The proposition implies that in the other case, where = 1=R, the steady-state economy without social security is at the second best. Transferring resources from working generations to retirees improves welfare since the marginal rate of substitution between two consecutive generations now is smaller than the marginal rate of transformation. Consequently, the planner would like to impose a positive tax, purely for inter-generational redistribution. 47 
The De…nition of Parameters in Proposition 1
Let q 2 27n 2 R (w u ) 2 =2n =27n 3 . b 0 , b 1 , 0 , 1 are de…ned as follows
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we …rst suppose that the median voter is the middle poor and solve for the equilibrium policy rules. We then show that conditions for the middle poor to be the median voter are satis…ed at each period.
Due to the linear-quadratic preference, it would be natural to guess that the policy rule T is linear
where 0 and 1 are two undetermined coe¢ cients. Substituting (41) into (11) solves
Combining (41) and (42), we obtain a linear social contract B
Plugging into (45) ; we get
is the …rst-best human-capital investment, and^ 0 + 1ĥ u is the baseline tax rate.
Plugging (43) into (16), the future tax base is
where 0 and 1 are de…ned by (40) and (38), respectively. Then, the …rst-order condition (18) yields
Our de…nition of Markov Perfect Equilibrium pins down 0 and 1 in (41) as a …xed point
Equation (50) implies a four-order polynomial of b 1 :
Factorizing (51), one root of b 1 equals R, which should be omitted by the necessary condition b 1 > 0 for the sustainability of social security. The other three roots solve
where R (w u ) 2 =2n. Rearrange (52):
It is straightforward to see that the LHS and the RHS of (53) have a unique cross with b 1 > 0, which gives the only real root of b 1 , i.e., (37). The other undetermined coe¢ cient b 0 can easily be solved.
Then we need to check whether T h u 1 2 [ ; ] for all h u 1 2 h; h . This gives the existence conditions (20) and (21) . Finally, we need to check whether the middle poor can be the median voter or, equivalently, the validity of m;u o in (15) . Note that the LHS of (22) is the highest tax rate for which the middle poor would vote. Given the equilibrium social contract B, the current tax base y t can be written as
Maximizing the indirect utility of the old, (14) solves o = min ; Y c h u 1 ; = @Y c h u 1 ; =@ .
In words, the old choose o to attain the top of the La¤er curve. Substituting the linear tax policy rule B into (54), we have
where b 0 and b 1 are de…ned in (39) and (37), respectively. Since o increases in h u 1 , the minimum o locates at h u 1 = h, which gives the RHS of (22) . Therefore, (22) says that the lowest tax rate for which the old would vote is larger than the highest tax for which the middle poor would vote.
Proof of Lemma 1
Di¤erentiating (52) with respect to w u , we have
It immediately follows that @ =@w u > 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
Note that T h = 0 requires 0 + 1 h 0, which implies 
Proof of Proposition 2
We …rst prove that 0 is increasing in w u . From (49), we can write
Using the fact that
Equation (57) delivers an implicit function for 0 , with
where f is de…ned as the RHS of (57). By Lemma 1, we only need to prove
where f x denotes the partial derivative of f to x. It is easy to show that
Therefore,
Taking derivatives, we …nd that
So, it is equivalent to prove
Using (56), (59) can be rewritten as
where Q 2 1 + (n + 1=R) b 1 + nb 2 1 =R + nb 1 =R 1:
Rearranging the inequality, we need to prove that
(1 + n) n 2 (2 + 1=R) b
We next prove that 1 is also increasing in w u . (50) gives 1 = 1 2n
As for (57), (62) delivers an implicit function for 1 , with
where g is de…ned as the RHS of (62). Following the same procedure as above, it is straightforward that implies that R= 1 + w u < 0 as 1 < 0. Therefore, the second argument in the bracket is positive. This, together with the positive sign of the …rst argument, establishes that g w u > 0:
Appendix Not For Publication
In this technical appendix, we describe our empirical method and the results in details. Since time-series data are often non-stationary, we first examine the time-series properties of the data using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the three variables. The results of unit-root tests are presented in Table 2 , which show that these variables contain a unit root in their levels (except for one test with DEP ). So, we assume all variables to be I (1). 48 In light of the properties of the data, it is natural to look at their cointegration relationship. 49 As shown in Table 3 , likelihood-ratio tests based on the trace of the stochastic matrix suggest a cointegrating relationship, while tests based on the maximum eigenvalue suggest no cointegration. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted by a relatively small margin in several cases. So, we conclude that there is a cointegrating relationship among SSB, D5/D1 and DEP . As for the number of cointegrating vectors, the results depend on the choice of critical value. If we use a significance level of 10 percent, likelihood-ratio tests based on the trace of the stochastic matrix without time trend find only one cointegrating vector, while the same tests with time trend suggest three cointegrating vectors. If a significance level of 5 percent is adopted, we again find a single cointegrating vector. In short, given the findings reported in Table 3 , we assume that there is a single cointegrating vector.
The cointegrating vector describing the long-run relationship among SSB, D5/D1 and DEP is estimated by the Johansen maximum likelihood. 50 Table 4 reports the results. Note that D5/D1 has a negative impact on SSB, suggesting a negative long-run correlation between inequality and social security. Further, the Johansen estimates of the coefficient of D5/D1 are statistically significant at the level of one percent. The dependency ratio (DEP ) is positively and significantly correlated with SSB, as expected. We then proceed by presenting in Table   5 the selected results of estimated vector error correction (VEC) models describing the shortrun dynamics of SSB. The coefficient of the error-correction term, Z (−1), in the equation of SSB is negative in all specifications. The estimates are marginally significant at the level of 10 percent, suggesting a convergence of SSB to the long-run equilibrium relationship.
[Insert Table 1 to 5] 48 Most tests show that SSB and D5/D1 are stationary in their first difference, suggesting that they are I (1). The null hypothesis of a unit root in the first difference of DEP , however, cannot be rejected. 49 The cointegration methodology is particularly useful for testing the validity of political theories providing implications on long-run relationships (e.g., Rodriguez, 1998) . 50 The ordinary least-square estimates yield qualitatively the same results as below; i.e., SSB is negatively correlated with D5/D1 and positively correlated with DEP . Standard errors are in the parenthesis. *** is significant at the 1% level. 
